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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a thesis as to why the US overtook the UK and other European countries in the 20th
century in both aggregate and per-capita GDP, as a case study of recent models of endogenous growth
where human capital is the "engine of growth". The conjecture is that the ascendancy of the US as
an economic superpower owes in large measure to its relatively faster human capital formation. Whether
the thesis has legs to stand on is assessed through stylized facts indicating that the US led other OECD
countries in schooling attainments per adult population over the 20 century, especially at the secondary
and tertiary levels. While human capital is viewed as the direct facilitator of growth, the underlying
factors driving the US ascendancy are linked to the superior returns the political-economic system













Common to the bulk of the “new” economic growth and development literature is the 
idea that the process by which less-developed countries break out of a poverty trap 
and achieve steady, self-sustaining growth in real per-capita income is predicated on 
persistent production and accumulation of “human capital.” This powerful concept is 
wrapped up in three layers of mystery. First, unlike physical capital, human capital is 
not a tangible asset. How, then, can we account for it empirically? Second, what 
explains its continuous formation over time? Third, how is such formation 
transformed into growth in real output and personal income?  
 
One of the objectives of this essay is to unwrap this apparent mystery through an 
exposition of a general-equilibrium paradigm of economic development where human 
capital, or knowledge, is the engine of growth, its accumulation is enabled by parental 
and public investments in children’s education, and underlying “exogenous” 
institutional and policy variables are ultimately responsible for both human capital 
formation and long-term growth.  
 
The paradigm is developed in the context of a competitive market economy in which 
human capital, measured imperfectly by quantitative indicators of schooling and 
training, is competitively rewarded and efficiently allocated to productive activities. 
The model also recognizes, however, the role of externalities such as market 
imperfections that affect adversely the accessibility and financing costs of schooling 
for those with borrowing constraints, or informal knowledge-spillover effects 
emanating from workers and entrepreneurs with superior education and skill, which 
enhance the productivity of others with whom they interact. The way these 
externalities are internalized may vary across different economies by the political and 
legal framework governing the economy, and as a consequence of accommodating 
economic and educational public policies, especially insofar as higher education is 
concerned. Such factors ultimately account for differential long-term growth patterns 
in different countries.  
 
A more specific objective of the presentation is to illustrate the power of the “human 
capital hypothesis” to explain observed differences in long-term growth dynamics 
across specific countries. The case in point is the emergence of the U.S. as the world 
economic superpower, overtaking the U.K., and Europe in general. The U.S. was a 
relatively poor country over much of the nineteenth century. In the last few decades 
of that century, and especially during the twentieth century, however, the U.S. has 
overtaken the U.K. and other major European countries, and then developed 
considerable advantage over these countries  in terms of not just gross domestic 
product, but per-capita GDP as well. What may be less known is that over the same 
period the U.S. has developed a considerable gap over Europe in the schooling 
attainments of its labor force, especially at the higher education level. The gap 
remained significant through the entire twentieth century, although it narrowed in the 2 
 
latter part of it, and is continuing to narrow in this decade. Largely accounting for this 
gap was the massive high school movement of 1915–1940, but an independent gap 
emerged as early as the 1860s with the U.S. foray into tertiary education beginning 
with the first Morrill Act of 1862, and continuing especially with the massive higher 
education movement following World War II. A basic argument of this paper is that 
the U.S. lead in knowledge formation, imperfectly measured by higher educational 
attainments, has been a major, and perhaps the major instrument through which the 
U.S. overtook Europe as the economic superpower in the twentieth century.  
 
To illustrate the case empirically, it is worth noting that by popular measures of real 
income used in international comparisons (GDP, adjusted by Purchasing Power 
Parity), the U.S. maintains a considerably larger level of per-capita income relative to 
practically all top twenty-five countries in the world, including even small tax-heaven 
countries (see appendix A, table A). In the early1800s, however, the U.S. had levels 
of GDP and GDP per capita considerably below that of the U.K. and it was not until 
1872 for GDP and 1905 for GDP per capita when the U.S. has overtaken the U.K. 
Figures 1 and 2 (see appendix B) illustrate the comparisons poignantly. Abstracting 
from  year-to-year and cyclical fluctuations, both the U.S. and U.K. graphs relating 
the logarithm of GDP or GDP per capita to chronological time appear over the long 
haul to resemble the shape of an upward-sloping straight line. The slope of each line 
represents the long-term annual growth rate of GDP or GDP per capita. The 
fundamental difference is that the slopes are higher for the U.S. relative to the U.K. In 
other words, the U.S. has overtaken the U.K. because its long-term growth rates have 
been higher: Over the 131-year period 1871–2003 (starting at the point of overtaking) 
the U.S. versus U.K. GDP growth rates have been 3.39% versus 1.91% per annum 
while the corresponding per-capita GDP growth rates were 1.87% versus 1.42%.
1 In 
recent decades, these gaps have narrowed. For example, over the period 1961–2003, 
the comparative growth rates of GDP in the U.S. versus the U.K. were 3.37% versus 
2.43%, while those for per-capita GDP were 2.25% versus 2.11%, respectively.
2 My 
basic thesis is that differences in long-term per-capita income growth stem primarily 
not from differences in physical stocks, including land or other natural resources, but 
                                                 
1 These statistics are taken from Maddison 2003. All figures are converted to 1990 U.S. 
dollars using the Geary Khamis Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) method. Similar graphs 
apply to other major European countries as well. For example the growth rates of GDP 
and GDP per capita (in parentheses) over the period 1850–2003—starting when the U.S. 
overtook other major European countries in per-capita GDP—were: 3.52 (1.83) for the 
U.S.; 1.98 (1.46) for the U.K.; 2.06 (1.72) for France; 2.31 (1.71) for Germany; 2.48 
(1.75) for Italy; 2.18 (1.82) for Spain. 
 
2 The shorter-term trends have been uneven for other major European countries. Over the 
period 1961–2003 the per-capita GDP growth rate in France and Italy were 0.21% and 
0.40% higher than in the U.S., respectively, while in Germany it was .14% lower. 
However, over 1976–2003, e.g., the U.S.’s per-capita GDP growth was 0.28% higher 
than France’s, 0.47% higher than Germany’s, and .06% higher than Italy’s.  
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from differences in the rates of growth of human capital. Both human capital 
formation and its impact on growth, however, are ultimately attributable to 
underlying institutional and policy factors which reward knowledge formation within 
an economy. In what follows I examine whether this hypothesis has a leg to stand on. 
 
1.  The “Mystery” of Growth: The Human Capital Hypothesis 
 
What accounts for differences in wealth across nations has been a key puzzle of 
economic science since Adam Smith. Logically, the question involves both static and 
dynamic elements: why are some nations doing better than others economically at a 
point in time, and why some nations become more successful than others over time. 
In the terminology of the current literature on economic growth and development, this 
two-part question relates to determinants of the long-term rate of growth, as distinct 
from the level, of per-capita real income or GDP, taking the latter to represent a scalar 
measure of personal economic welfare.  
 
A significant advance in the modern economic treatment of the problem came about 
with the neoclassical growth model, which identifies key factors contributing to a 
steady-state level of per-capita income and its associated capital-labor ratio (K/L), 
under any exogenously given rate of population growth and level of production 
technology. The model thus attributes persistent growth in per-capita income over 
time, which is a more relevant measure of private economic welfare than aggregate 
income, strictly to exogenous technological shocks. This inference can be 
conveniently illustrated via the following “neoclassical” aggregate production 
function: 
  
Y = B(T)F(L, K), where Y is the economy’s aggregate output, F is a constant-returns-
to-scale production function summarizing the impact of conventional labor (L) and 
physical capital (K) inputs on production, and B(T) represents the process by which 
“technology” (T) augments the impact of these inputs. Under an exogenously given 
technology, the neoclassical growth model suggests that the steady-state level of per-
capita real income (y) is given by: 
 
(1) y* ≡ B(T)f(k*),  
 
where k* ≡ (K/L)* is the “golden rule,” or equilibrium capital to labor ratio. 
 
Growth in the equilibrium per-capita income level y* can thus occur by this analysis 
through exogenous technological advances. The role of technology, B(T), can be 
interpreted more broadly to include any and all factors that enhance the utilization of 
the labor and physical capital resources available to the economy at a point it time. In 
principle, therefore, the economic and regulatory policies that facilitate the 
operational efficiency of the market economy within which economic resources are 
utilized are also subsumed by this factor—a point that will be further underscored in 
later sections. Like technology, these factors are assumed to be exogenously given to 
the economy. They affect the level of output per capita at a point in time.  4 
 
 
In the last two hundred years or so, however, the world has witnessed a relatively new 
phenomenon in economic history: persistent and seemingly self-sustaining growth in 
per-capita real income over the long haul in most of the so-called developed 
economies following the technological shock produced by the industrial revolution. 
Periodic and occasionally large business-cycle disturbances notwithstanding, this 
phenomenon is still continuing, although at a different pace in different countries. 
Furthermore, over the last century or so, the world has also experienced episodes of 
economic takeoffs by less developed countries from relatively stagnant, low income 
levels into regimes of self-sustaining growth (e.g., the Asian Tigers), as well as 
episodes in which a relatively poor economy has overtaken a much wealthier one 
(e.g., the U.S. versus Europe). If “exogenous” factors, such as accidental 
technological discoveries, are the key to this mystery, what accounts for the smooth 
and continuous, but also variable, productivity growth in different countries, 
especially when technological discoveries originating in one country can be rapidly 
imitated and adopted by any other country? 
 
The answer offered by much of the recently developed “endogenous growth” 
literature (see Lucas 1988, and the articles in Ehrlich 1990) rests on identifying 
“technology” as “human capital,” and modeling continuous and self-sustaining 
technological advances as the outcome of persistent investment in human capital 
treated as a decision variable, subject to individual and social choice, within a 
dynamic, general equilibrium framework. The concept of human capital as an 
intangible asset is perhaps best defined as a stock of embodied and disembodied 
knowledge, comprising education, information, health, entrepreneurship, and 
productive and innovative skills, that is formed through investments in schooling, job 
training, and health, as well as through research and development projects, and 
informal knowledge transfers (see Ehrlich and Murphy 2007). By this definition 
human capital has two inherent dimensions: “embodied” and “disembodied.” The 
first is knowledge embodied in workers, or skill, which augments the productivity of 
labor and physical capital inputs at a point in time. The second is creative knowledge 
that flows from the minds of scholars, scientists, inventors, and entrepreneurs and 
increases their capacity to accumulate new knowledge. This “disembodied” 
knowledge is manifested in papers, books, patents, and algorithms, and winds up as 
technological advances—product and process innovations—at the firm and industry 
levels. It is thus more likely to be acquired and produced in tertiary institutions of 
teaching and research. While these types of human capital are distinct, they are also 
complementary, as creative knowledge feeds on previously accumulated embodied 
knowledge and facilitates the acquisition of new knowledge.  
 
In this view, technology as popularly understood—inventions, innovations, scientific 
discoveries—does not “fall from heaven”: it stems from decisions made by families, 
firms, and governments to invest in schooling, job training, and research and 
development, making human capital the relevant “engine,” or facilitator, of growth. 
The fuel that feeds this engine are the rewards or rates of return offered by efficient 
markets and government policies to investments in knowledge formation, or human 5 
 
capital. Skill and creative knowledge can accumulate continuously in a given 
economy only if the underlying reward system in that economy supports a sufficient 
investment in skills and creative knowledge beyond a critical level.  
 
But how does one measure human capital empirically? The empirical literature 
associated with this concept identifies it typically as a function of years of schooling 
and job experience. These measures must be supplemented, however, by 
corresponding measures of educational quality. Also missing are supplementary 
education and research efforts at the firm level, which become more important at 
advanced stages of development, and informal knowledge transfers. Indeed, the 
hypothesis that investment in schooling serves as an engine of long-term growth is 
yet to be verified through systematic econometric studies (but see section 6.C for 
some empirical insights). Nevertheless, I here venture to apply this hypothesis using 
as a case study the comparative long-term real income growth and educational 
attainment paths of the U.S. versus the U.K. and other major European countries over 
the last century. My dual hypotheses are: first, the economic overtaking of Europe by 
the U.S. beginning in the late nineteenth century, and its continuing dominance 
through the twentieth century, owe largely to the faster and more widespread 
schooling attainments, especially at the upper-secondary and the tertiary levels; and 
second, these differential schooling attainments, whether domestically produced or 
imported, are ultimately attributable to the higher reward the U.S. economy has 
offered to human capital attainments owing to accommodating political and  
institutional factors. To flash out these arguments I begin by surveying some 
historical evidence on the evolution of different schooling attainments in the U.S. 
relative to Europe over the twentieth century.  
 
2.  Evidence on Educational Attainments: Does the Thesis Have a Leg to Stand 
On? 
 
The following is a summary of illustrative data on comparative educational 
attainments and educational spending by selected categories involving the U.S. and 
other European or OECD countries, as reported in authoritative publications. Since 
year-to-year reports do not always involve the same categories, occasionally 
alternative years of data have been selected. 
 
2.1. Data on Schooling Attainments in the U.S. versus OECD Countries over the 
Last Century 
  
Table 1: Average years of formal educational experience of the population aged 15–
64 in 1913 and 1989 (Maddison’s data). Highlights of table 1 (see appendix A) 
include Maddison’s finding (1991) that in 1913 average schooling years in the U.S. 
(6.93) was behind Germany (6.94) and the U.K. (7.28). Japan had the lowest 
attainment (5.10). Even at that point, however, the U.S. already had the highest 
average higher education attainments in years in 1913 (0.2), followed by Netherlands 
(0.11), and France (0.10). In 1989, in contrast, Maddison’s data indicate that the U.S. 
became the leader in schooling attainments at all levels. Average schooling years in 
the U.S. shot up to 13.39, ahead of Japan (11.66), France (11.61), and the U.K. 6 
 
(11.28). Germany slipped to last place at 9.58. The average number of higher-
education years attained in the U.S. was 1.67, ahead of France (1.32), with other 
countries substantially lower. Note that Japan, which was at the last place in average 
schooling attainments in 1913, rose to second place in 1989.
3 Unfortunately, no 
comparable data were available for the same population groups and countries in more 
recent years, but the following tables allow for such international comparisons using 
alternative educational attainment measures. 
 
2.2. Recent Evidence from OECD’s Education at a Glance, 1998 and 2003 
 
2.2.1. Schooling Attainments 
 
Table 2: Percentage of the population that has attained at least tertiary education 
Type-A by age group 1998 and 2003. Table 2 (see appendix A) shows that in 1998, 
the U.S.’s percentage of the population 25–64 years of age educated in tertiary type-A 
programs, defined as regular four-year colleges or universities and advanced research 
programs, reaches 26.6%, followed by Norway’s 23.7%. In this year, the U.S. figure 
is decisively above Europe’s five major economies: U.K., Germany, France, Italy, 
and Spain (E-5), while the average for all OECD countries is scarcely above half of 
the U.S. A striking pattern of the educational gap is that it is higher among older age 
cohorts. In the age group 55–64, for example, the corresponding U.S. percentage is 
22%, relative to just 9% for the OECD average. By 2003 Norway catches up with the 
U.S. in the age group 25–64 at 29%, but the average for all OECD countries is still 
substantially below the U.S. (16%). In the age groups 45–54 and 55–64, however, the 
U.S. maintains a decisive advantage of a 2 to 1 ratio or over in 2003 as well. 
 
Tertiary type-B programs, in contrast, which are more popular in some OECD 
countries (e.g., Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden) relate to vocational, rather 
than academic institutions. But even in total tertiary educational attainments, the U.S. 
is second only to Canada in the age group 25–64 and is leading in the age group 55–
64 in 2003. (These data are not included in table 2, but the source for both is the 
same.)  
 
Table 3: Distribution of the population that has attained at least upper secondary 
education, by age group 1998 and 2003. Highlights of table 3 (see appendix A) 
include that in 1998 and 2003, the U.S. is leading in the age group 25–64 (86%, 
88%), relative to the OECD means (61%, 66%) but much more so in the age group 
55–64 (80%, 85%), where the second highest are Germany and Japan (76%, 78%). 
The gap narrows at younger age groups. In the age group 25–34 in 2003, the U.S. is 
in eighth place behind, Korea, Norway, Japan, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Sweden, Finland, and Canada, but above all the E-5, including Germany. These data 
                                                 
3 Early comparative educational data are difficult to collect. Some economic historians 
believe, however, that the U.S. relative advantage in education was showing up even 
before 1913, which would even more strongly support the basic thesis of this paper. 
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indicate that a number of OECD countries have caught up with the U.S. in terms of 
secondary schooling in more recent years. But the U.S. again shows overwhelming 
leadership in terms of the proportion of the population that has attained at least 
tertiary education. 
 
Table 4: Expected years of tertiary education for all 17-year-olds (1998). This table 
(see appendix A) demonstrates more vividly that while the U.S. is still in a dominant 
position in terms of the expected number of years of tertiary type-A education: 2.7 
years for both part-time and full-time workers, Finland (2.9) and Norway (2.7) have 
already caught up with the U.S., but France at 1.9 and the U.K. at 1.7 have not done 
so. 
 
The attainments data tell a dynamic story: the U.S. advantage is highest in the older 
age categories. The gap is narrowing at the younger ages as well as over time, which 
indicates that Europe is closing the educational gap. But the U.S. still holds a 
commanding lead in the category of those who hold at least tertiary type-A education, 
especially at older age cohorts. 
       
  
2.2.2. Expenditures on Education  
 
Comparative schooling attainments, as illustrated by tables 1-4 are but one dimension 
of an effective measure of human capital. As important is the quality of the education 
experience. A possible measure of quality typically used by economists is educational 
spending, to which I turn next. 
 
Table 5: Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP for all 
levels of education by source of funds (1990, 1995, and 2002) (see appendix A). At 
7.2% of GDP in 2002, the U.S. ranks among the top countries in terms of total 
expenditure from both public and private sources for education institutions, being 
surpassed only by Iceland (7.4%), with Denmark and Korea (both 7.1%) following 
the U.S. But these numbers are not fully revealing because they do not account for the 
differences in the magnitude and composition of student populations across countries. 
More relevant are data on total spending per student, and these are much higher in the 
U.S. relative to other OECD countries (see below). 
 
Table 6: Annual expenditures on educational institutions per student (U.S. dollars 
converted using PPP) by levels of education based on full-time equivalents (2002) 
(see appendix A). The U.S. expenditure per student on all levels of secondary 
education in 2002 was $9098, while the average among OECD countries was $6992, 
but at this point the U.S. already ranks behind Switzerland ($11,900), and Norway 
($10,154) (Luxembourg at $15,195, is not a comparable country). In the case of 
tertiary educational expenditures (both type A and B), however, the U.S. ($20,545) is 
second only to Switzerland ($23,714), and only Sweden ($15,715) and Denmark 
($15,183) have spending levels above $15,000.  
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Table 7: Expenditure per student (private and public) relative to GDP per capita by 
level of education based on full-time equivalents (2002) (see appendix A). The U.S. 
ratio here (25) is just about equal to the average in OECD countries in the case of all 
secondary expenditures (26), but at 57, it is still substantially above the average in 
OECD countries (43) in the case of all tertiary expenditures. To the extent that 
education can be considered a consumption good, this ranking indicates only that 
higher education in the U.S. is now a necessity rather than a luxury good (with 
income elasticity of demand falling short of unity). But these ratios may largely 
reflect differences in the weight of other types of spending on, say, private 
consumption or public defense, across different countries. 
 
  
3. How the U.S. Schooling Advantage Emerged: Major Sources and Trends 
 
a.  The secondary schooling advantage.  Claudia Goldin (see, e.g., 2001) argues that 
what has been mainly responsible for the U.S. advance over Europe is the massive 
“high school movement of 1910–1940.”  Her thesis is that, although advances in 
higher education have been important, the mass secondary education system, 
which first emerged in the U.S., set the stage for the subsequent transition to the 
mass higher education movement. In 1910, school enrollment rates for five- to 
nineteen-year-olds were fairly similar among the world’s economic leaders (the 
ratio of enrollments relative to the U.S. set at 1 was: .93 in France, .96 in 
Germany, and .82 in the U.K.). But by 1930, the U.S. was three to four decades 
ahead of Britain and France, and the high school gap remained large until the 
1950s. The median eighteen-year-old person was already a high school graduate 
in the early 1940s. This had a knock-on effect on the massive development of 
higher education institutions after World War II: when President Franklin 
Roosevelt signed the GI Bill in 1944, the average GI could attend college because 
(s)he had already graduated from high school.  
 
b.  The Morrill Acts and the Land Grant institutions of higher learning. What is 
being overlooked by the previous explanation, however, is that the U.S. already 
held the lead in tertiary enrollment in 1913, as Maddison’s data show. What may 
have been responsible for this historical development are the Morrill Acts (Land 
Grant Creation) of 1862 and 1890, and related accommodating factors which 
made higher education in the U.S. accessible to larger segments of the population 
relative to Europe. John Morrill was a Congressman from Vermont who managed 
to convince Congress and President Lincoln to launch a system of public higher 
education, to be financed through land grants from the federal government to the 
states. Under the terms of the original Morrill Act, later supplemented by the 
Hatch Act of 1887, the second Morrill Act of 1890, and the Smith-Lever Act of 
1914, public lands, or funds in lieu of public lands, were granted to the states for 
the establishment and support of land-grant colleges and universities, as well as 
research stations that focused on agricultural and mechanical-art studies and 
research. I am not aware of any systematic analysis of the role the Morrill Acts 
had in the evolution of the higher education system in the U.S., but some 9 
 
important facts allude to their significance. There were sixty-eight land-grant 
public institutions and universities located in the fifty states and Puerto Rico in 
1961. Although at that point in time—following the explosion in tertiary 
institutions after World War II—these institutions, varying greatly in size from 
the University of California to Delaware State College, accounted for just less 
than 5% of all four-year institutions of higher learning, they still accounted for 
48% of total organized research expenditures, 40% of the doctorates conferred, 
33% of the current-fund income for educational and general purposes, and 28% of 
the value of plant assets in the U.S.
4  
 
c.  The GI Bill of 1944. The public education system, bolstered by the Land Grant 
movement, received a huge impetus by the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, 
popularly known as the GI Bill, signed by President Roosevelt in June 1944. The 
act mandated the federal government to subsidize tuition, fees, books, and 
educational materials for veterans meeting educational admission requirements, 
and to contribute to the living expenses they would incur while attending college 
or other approved institutions of their free choosing. The GI Bill created a 
massive higher education movement. Within the following seven years, 
approximately eight million veterans received educational benefits. Of that 
number, approximately 2.3 million attended colleges and universities. The high 
school movement of 1910–1940 played a critical role in facilitating this 
development since almost half of the soldiers returning home from World War II 
had a high school diploma and were thus eligible to enroll in colleges and 
universities. The U.S. lead in higher education was enhanced not just by the GI 
Bill, but also by federal Pell grants and the legislation of tuition assistance 
supports in many states. Again, Europe was lagging behind the U.S. in this regard 
over much of the second half of the twentieth century. The British Education Act 
of 1955, for example, just guaranteed all youth a publicly funded elementary and 
secondary schooling. 
 
d.  Immigration and the brain drain. Another key factor which accounts for a good 
part of the U.S. schooling advantage is immigration of human capital into the U.S. 
In an open economy human capital is not necessarily just homegrown—it can be 
imported through immigration of skilled and highly educated labor. It is beyond 
the scope of this essay to assess systematically the brain drain into the U.S., but 
there is general agreement for the proposition that the U.S. became a magnet for 
                                                 
4 See Statistics of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities [LGCU], Year ended June 1961, 
U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare, Office of Education. In June 2005, 
the LGCU national association had 214 members. This includes seventy-six land-grant 
universities (36% of the membership), of which eighteen are the historically black public 
institutions created by the Second Morrill Act of 1890, and twenty-seven public higher 
education systems (12% of the membership). In addition, tribal colleges became land-
grant institutions in 1994 and 33 are represented in the National Association of State 
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges) through the membership of the American Indian 
Higher Education Consortium. 
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skilled labor and scientists, first from Europe and later from Asia as well, 
following the economic advances of the U.S. in the twentieth century, especially 
after World War II. Dramatic support for this conjecture is provided in a 2005 
study by the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, showing that 
the share of all the science and engineering doctorates awarded to international 
students rose from 23% in 1966 to 39% in 2000, the share of temporary residence 
among science and engineering post-doctoral scholars increased from 37% in 
1982 to 59% in 2002, and more than one-third of U.S. Nobel Laureates to date are 
foreign born.  
A number of caveats need to be recognized, however, for a more complete 
assessment of the U.S. schooling advantage: 
i.     The U.S. advantage at the tertiary level applies unequivocally to type-A 
institutions (regular four-year colleges/universities), but not as much to tertiary 
type-B, which are more vocational in nature. The latter has remained more 
popular in Europe. Also, the numbers do not include post formal training and 
apprenticeships, which are more prevalent in Europe. 
ii.    However, schooling attainments, measured as the number of years of schooling 
or the percentage of the population with tertiary education, have institutional 
upper limits, for instance, a PhD degree, thus becoming a less effective measure 
of knowledge formation in highly developed economies. It is thus critical to take 
into account another dimension of educational attainments, which is more open-
ended—schooling quality as captured by level of spending per student. In this 
regard, the educational gap between the US and the major European countries 
remains significant, as illustrated by Tables 5-7. Furthermore, investments in 
knowledge at the firm level via general on-the-job training and specific research 
and development programs are becoming a more important means of knowledge 
formation in the more developed economies. The U.S. may still hold a sizeable 
advantage over Europe in this supplementary human capital measure as well. 
iii.   Both schooling lengths and expenditure levels are in essence “inputs” into 
effective human capital formation. The picture is far more mixed concerning 
“output” or quality measures, such as math test scores. Evidence indicates that 
the distribution of U.S. combined mathematics literacy scores of fifteen-year-old 
students is, in fact, below that of the average of OECD countries and in the mid-
range of the E-5 countries (see appendix A, table 8). In contrast, at the tertiary 
level, U.S. academic institutions are generally ranked higher than Europe’s and 
attract more international students and faculty.  
 
4. Whence the Divergence? Contributing Factors  
 
 (a)   Educational templates. Goldin (2001) and Goldin and Katz (1999) emphasize 
the implicit choice between general training (formal schooling) and specific 11 
 
training (apprenticeship, on-the-job training options). General training is more 
expensive, but it produces more transferable and flexible skills across 
geographical areas, occupations and industries. The focus on general training in 
the U.S. is attributable to the U.S. developing into a larger open-trade area 
relative to European countries. Its labor force in the early twentieth century was 
more mobile and responsive to technological changes in manufacturing, 
telecommunications, large-scale farming, and retailing. 
 
(b)   Economic development. The growth of the industrial and transportation sectors 
of the economy and the expanding size of the U.S. domestic market raised the 
rate of return to education, secondary and higher education specifically. The 
intellectual high school movements which started in New England spread 
quickly to the rich agricultural areas in central and western states, where rates of 
return to schooling were as high for blue-collar workers and farmers as for 
white-collar workers. The high school movement gained momentum also 
because of the decentralized educational system in the U.S. owing to the fiscal 
independence of local school boards.  
 
(c)   Feedback wealth effects. By the early twentieth century, the U.S. already had the 
highest income per capita, enabling families to more easily finance the higher 
education of offspring. 
  
(d)   Educational policies. The U.S. educational system has been more democratic, 
secular, and gender neutral. In contrast, the educational systems in Germany, 
France, and other European countries were more rigid and elitist over much of 
the twentieth century. Differences in institutional restrictions are manifested 
especially in the context of tertiary education. In the U.S., publicly subsidized 
higher education started with the Morrill Acts, becoming massive in 1944, while 
in Europe this process began later—in some countries not until the 1960s and 
70s. In France, for example, the number of college students started increasing 
considerably only during the 1980s because of the knock-on effect of expanding 
secondary education: a political decision was made to increase to 80% the 
percentage of age cohorts that would reach the level of the baccalauriat, and 
admissions to the first year of university studies was guaranteed to anyone with a 
high school diploma, regardless of type. Although European tertiary institutions 
have become virtually tuition-free in recent decades, access to these colleges and 
universities remained much more restricted until recently. The U.S., in contrast, 
has practiced virtually universal admission to higher education, albeit with 
differences between community colleges and public and private colleges and 
universities. As noted in section 2, however, that the gap in higher education 
enrollments between the U.S. and Europe is fast closing.
5  
 
                                                 
5 For a survey of European school systems, see section B (Structures and Schools) of 
Eurodice 2000. 
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(e)   The political-economic systems. Last, but not least, the U.S. has had a more 
democratic political system; e.g., suffrage was extended to all (white) U.S. males 
early in the nineteenth century, but much later in almost all European countries. 
It has also had a freer and more decentralized economy, where individuals, 
families, and firms can make resource allocation decisions in largely free 
markets, bolstered by the rule of law and protection of property rights, including 
intellectual property. The U.S. has also had less regulated labor markets, and 
greater openness to external trade and immigration relative to Europe. These 
factors helped produce a relatively high rate of return to human capital 
investments for the domestic population, and a larger premium on completed 
education for skilled immigrants. 
 
The preceding analysis traces the gap in educational attainments favoring the U.S. in 
the twentieth century to the interplay of two main forces:  first, the feedback effects 
on private demand for education generated by the new industrial economy, economic 
growth, and personal wealth; second, the impact of the more open economy and 
society in the U.S. on the returns to human capital formation, whether domestically 
produced or imported, and thereby on economic growth.   
 
By items (a)–(c) above, economic affluence leads to greater demand for education as 
consumption, or to greater ability to finance private educational investments by 
overcoming inherent imperfections in the capital market. Items (d)–(e) above trace 
the growth in educational attainments to institutional, political, and economic policies 
that lower the costs, or raise the potential returns to investment in especially higher 
education, thus enabling individuals and firms to capture more fully any external 
effects generated by education. These factors also encourage immigration of workers 
with superior education or entrepreneurial ability. Put differently, the democratic 
capitalism exercised in the U.S. has0 contributed to a higher rate of return to 
individual investment in human capital generally, and tertiary education in particular.  
 
While the two groups of factors represent apparently opposite directions of causality 
regarding the association between human capital formation and economic growth, 
they are, in fact, complementary. Greater investment in human capital as a proportion 
of total production capacity raises productivity growth, while the demand for human 
capital investments is partly a by-product of economic growth, and this needs to be 
accounted for in regression analyses aiming to explain productivity growth as a 
function of educational spending. But this would be a partial-equilibrium view of 
economic development. The endogenous growth, general equilibrium model 
discussed below sees both human capital formation and productivity growth as 
endogenous outcomes of underlying legal and political factors. Moreover, prudent 
political and economic policies are also affected by the schooling level of the 
electorate. In this view, the critical causal factors can be traced especially to those 
summarized in item (e).  
  
5.  Linking Human Capital Formation with Economic Growth  
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5.1. The Endogenous Growth Hypothesis: Human Capital as the Engine of 
Growth 
 
The literature on endogenous growth attempts to go beyond the neoclassical model of 
economic growth in two important ways: (a) explaining persistent growth as a result of 
factors endogenous to the economy, rather than exogenous, unpredictable technological 
inventions; (b) identifying “technology” as human capital, or knowledge. By this view, 
knowledge breeds greater knowledge. Some new knowledge translates into higher 
productivity of existing resources (embodied human capital), and some is manifested 
through innovations, patents, manuscripts, and specialized capital goods that account for 
what is commonly perceived of as technological innovations (“disembodied human 
capital”). Human capital is ultimately the source of both types of “technology,” and can 
therefore be considered the engine of growth (see Lucas 1988, Becker et al. 1990, and 
Ehrlich and Lui 1991).  
 
The reason persistent growth is enabled by human capital formation is that knowledge is 
the only instrument of production that is not subject to diminishing returns, as John 
Maurice Clark (1923) argued. The idea can be formalized in a simple way by specifying 
a law of human capital accumulation as follows:  
 
(2) Ht+1 = A (H
e
 + Ht) ht  
 
Here Ht and Ht+1 represent the human capital stocks of a representative agent in 
generations t and t+1, A represents the technology of learning and human capital 
transfer, (H
e
 + Ht) denotes production capacity (H
e representing fixed personal or family 
endowments and Ht acquired knowledge at t), which is transformed to per-capita real 
income, or output y = (H
e
 + Ht), at an implicit constant competitive rental rate 
(normalized at 1); and ht represents the fraction of production capacity spent by 
members of generation t on the human capital formation of members of generation t+1. 
While the level of human capital attained by the next generation, Ht+1, could in principle 
be subject to diminishing returns in the rate of investment by the current generation, 
captured by ht, it is specified as a linear function of the human capital attained by the 
current generation, Ht. The implicit argument is that attained knowledge and skill by any 
given generation enhances both the creation of new knowledge and the productivity of 
intergenerational knowledge transfer to the overlapping future generation, thus escaping 
diminishing returns. 
 
Human capital can thus grow perpetually from one generation to the other essentially 
because the level of productive knowledge attained by a current generation serves as an 
input into the generation of knowledge in the succeeding generation. But whether the 
latter exceeds the former (or Ht+1 > Ht) and to what extent, critically depends on whether 
investment in human capital exceeds a threshold level: by equation (2) if investment, ht, 
is not sufficiently high, the knowledge attained by generation t + 1 will be stuck at the 
level of generation t, Ht, producing a stagnant equilibrium level of output. In a 
decentralized market economy and a democratic political system, investment in human 14 
 
capital is affected directly by individuals and families, as well as indirectly by the level 
of public spending they demand from their local and federal government.  
 
Of course, the production of human capital is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for expansion in productive capacity. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that 
accumulated human capital contributes to expansion in desired output (Y) through the 
aggregate production function introduced in section 1 and the accommodating role of 
efficient markets, which assure the allocation of skill and creative knowledge to their 
most productive uses. The endogenous growth paradigm indicates that in a steady state 
of continuous growth, physical capital accumulation, including natural resources and 
productive land, would adjust to the pace of human capital accumulation, making the 
latter the economy’s engine of growth. At a given population level, continuous human 
capital formation will lead to continuous expansion in real output per capita (y). Human 
capital (H) thus replaces the concept of “technology” (T) in equation (1).   
 
The model outlined in the preceding discussion is a closed economy model. In an 
open economy, expansion of output is also conditional on the ability of the economy 
to retain the human capital it produces. The U.S. was not the first to take off: the 
industrial revolution began in Europe. But the emergence of the U.S. as an economic 
superpower can be attributed to the ability of the U.S. market to provide a high 
reward for human capital investments, and thus to both retain domestically produced 
human capital and attract human capital produced abroad.  
 
5.2. The Special Role of Higher Education in Economic Growth 
 
The previous analysis also rests on the simplifying assumption that workers are 
homogenous. In reality, people are heterogeneous in terms of both innate ability and 
family endowments they possess. A more complete view of endogenous growth and 
development, based on human capital as engine of growth, must recognize 
differences among individuals and families in terms of their capacity to both acquire 
and implement knowledge. This is the framework used in my current joint work on 
income growth and income inequality (Ehrlich and Kim 2007) which is used to 
explain the dynamic pattern of both income growth and income distribution over 
different stages of economic development. 
  
The story is simple: human capital, as measured by average schooling attainments, 
has a direct effect on the skill and productivity of the existing labor force, but also an 
indirect effect on the emergence of new ideas, that is, technological innovations and 
productivity growth. Those who are in a position to acquire more human capital, 
especially higher education, because of personal ability or family endowments 
allowing them to more economically finance higher education, are likely to be the 
“first movers” when it comes to create new knowledge, or implement advances in 
knowledge triggered by technological shocks. Both schools and the labor market also 
allow for the socialization of knowledge, whereby the achievements of workers with 
superior knowledge can spill over to, and be shared by, other workers. These 
“spillover effects” tie population groups of different human capital attainments 15 
 
together over the development process as well as in a regime of persistent growth, 
and ultimately produce stable income distributions. The existence of spillover effects 
and imperfections in the capital market also justify government’s subsidization of 
education, and especially higher education, in order to maximize social income and 
welfare. 
 
5.3. The Role of Underlying Factors 
 
The endogenous growth models described above are general equilibrium models. In 
such models, both human capital accumulation and income growth are “endogenous” 
choice variables: they attain self-sustaining growth as a consequence of individual 
choices about optimal investments individuals make in themselves and their 
offspring, motivated by a desire to maximize the return they obtain on these 
investments. Individual welfare maximization in a decentralized market system thus 
leads to continuous, self-sustaining growth for the average person in the economy—a 
dynamic restatement of Adam Smith’s basic proposition.  
 
But this also means that human capital accumulation and income growth are two 
sides of the same coin: while the production functions (1) and (2) represent a causal 
relation flowing from per-capita human capital formation (H) to per-capita income 
(y), this is a secondary causality. The primary one relates to the causal effects of 
underlying “parameters” that influence both variables; most importantly, factors 
enhancing the incentives individuals and families have to invest in their own, and 
their offspring’s, knowledge, as well as the ability of the domestic economy to 
effectively utilize the human capital it generates or imports in domestic production.   
 
Basic parameters affecting both output and knowledge accumulation are knowledge 
production and transfer technologies—A and B (T) in equations 2 and 1—and 
population longevity (see Ehrlich and Lui 1991), which enable those investing in 
learning and training to recoup the benefits of their investments over a longer lifetime 
horizon. Equally important, however, are “institutional” factors, such as the “rule of 
law”, a legal system which protects intellectual and property rights, and a free-
enterprise system where wages and rates of return on investment are determined by 
competitive market forces rather than bureaucratic intervention. They also include 
accommodating public educational policies that help overcome capital market 
constraints in education financing and internalize spillover effects generated by basic 
science. These accommodating factors, including government regulations and tax 
policies, can greatly affect output growth by the way they enhance or discourage the 
incentives to invest in human capital. For example, under a heavily regulated system, 
let alone a command economy, the bureaucracy rather than free markets determines 
the allocation and remuneration of resources, including education. The Soviet Union 
invested heavily in basic sciences used largely to promote military might, not 
necessarily economic might. Its command economy system also fostered investment 
in “political capital” promising bureaucratic power to apparatchiks, rather than in 
market-driven productive human capital (see Ehrlich and Lui 1999.) A free market 16 
 
system is better geared to reward human capital of the productive type through the 
market mechanism, and is thus more likely to produce self-generating growth.  
 
Free trade and an open economy create greater opportunities for human capital 
accumulation, but also greater challenges. Greater opportunities, because investment 
in “disembodied knowledge” such as new production processes or new products is 
subject to scale economies, which make their returns higher in a larger market open to 
free trade. Greater challenges, because opportunities to migrate from one region or 
country to another mean that investment in human capital made in one place may 
actually wind up benefiting another. Public investment in human capital in Peru or in 
Ireland before 1986, for example, did not bring about an economic takeoff and self-
sustaining growth partly because graduates of institutions of higher learning sought 
employment in the U.S. market rather than in their own countries. But this does not 
refute the thesis that investment in human capital is the key to economic growth. It 
simply reflects the fact that investment that is not backed up by a market system that 
assures an adequate reward to knowledge cannot be expected to yield its full 
economic benefits.   
 
A final underlying factor is the role of externalities inherent in both the production 
and transfer of human capital. Private human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot 
serve as collateral in financial markets, which limits borrowing opportunities. This 
justifies a public role in the financing of education at all levels, but especially higher 
education, where investment is substantial, which enhances accessibility to such 
educational opportunities according to talent rather than social class and borrowing 
constraints. Moreover, since higher education can generate spillover effects on the 
productivity of less educated workers that are not fully internalized through a private 
reward system, subsidizing it becomes an especially important role of government. 
That the U.S. was a leader in opening up massive high school and higher-education 




6.  Evidence Linking Education and Productivity Growth 
 
      6.1. Evidence from Growth Accounting 
 
Estimates of the role of schooling in explaining per-worker income variations or 
growth rely on a “growth accounting methodology,” following the works of Denison 
(1974) and Solow (1957). The technique ascribes changes in the aggregate economy 
(GDP per capita) to variations in aggregate measures of capital utilization and labor 
employment, with the labor employment index weighted by measures of the 
education attainments of workers. Claudia Goldin and others estimate that over the 
twentieth century (actually since 1915) the expansion in the educational index has 
accounted for close to a quarter of the 1.62 percent per year increase in U.S. labor 
productivity. Hall and Jones (1999) estimate that in 1988, educational attainments 17 
 
account for over 20 percent of the international variation in labor productivity across 
different countries.  
 
Studies using the growth accounting methodology invariably find a substantial 
unexplained residual variation in productivity, known as the “Solow residual.” It is 
generally attributed to “technological growth.” However, much of this residual 
variation may be ascribed to the indirect role of education in inducing technological 
advancements, as technology is a derivative of special knowledge, or specific human 
capital. Indeed, this is the crux of the "endogenous growth" literature that identifies 
human capital as the engine of growth.  
 
      6.2. Evidence from Rates of Return to Education 
 
That education is the critical factor explaining differences in earnings across 
individuals at a point in time has been well established by human capital theory and 
related empirical work. The human-capital-earnings-generating function formulated 
by Jacob Mincer links the logarithm of individual earnings to the number of years of 
schooling and a quadratic specification of the number of years of job-market 
experience. This specification allows the measurement of the “rate of return to human 
capital” as the regression coefficient associated with the number of years of 
schooling. Table 9 (see appendix A), based on a study by Heckman, Lochner, and 
Todd (2003), indicates that the real rate of return to schooling thus measured has been 
stable at upward of 10% in six decennial years, but has approached 13% in 1990. 
More important, by estimating separate regressions for white and black males, this 
study shows that over the period 1940–1990, rates of return to blacks, initially lower 
than those of whites, have more than caught up with the latter in 1990, indicating that 
the U.S. labor markets have become more competitive over time, and better able to 
reward human capital regardless of race. 
 
The Mincerian linear regression model does not allow for separate estimation of rates 
of returns by alternative levels of schooling. By relaxing various linearity restrictions 
implicit in the Mincer model, however, Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) have 
also estimated rates of return for primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of schooling 
as well. Their results indicate that the rates of return are considerably higher for those 
actually completing high school and college education relative to other levels of 
schooling.
6 Other studies indicate that that the rate of return to especially college 
education shoots upward at times of rapid technological innovation, essentially 
because people with higher skills adapt more quickly to changes in technology. 
                                                 
6 International comparisons using Mincer’s model or related techniques are hampered by 
the absence of comparable data. Existing evidence suggests, however, that estimated rates 
of return in the U.S. tend to be high relative to those in other highly developed countries 
(See, e.g., Psacharopulous and Patrinos 2002). Less developed countries may show 
unusually high rates of return to schooling during a takeoff period from stagnation to 
continuous, self-sustaining growth regimes. 
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These studies focus on returns to education captured in market earnings. New work in 
economics indicates that this may greatly understate the full individual returns to 
education, which are derived from various nonmarket activities as well, such as 
improved health, longevity, and implicit individual assessments of their own life-
saving values. Ehrlich and Yin (2005), for example, estimate that both age-specific 
life expectancies and implicit private values of life-saving are substantially higher for 
those with tertiary, relative to high-school education. 
 
      6.3. Linking Investment in Schooling and Per-Capita Income Growth 
 
Empirical studies linking educational attainments and economic growth have not 
produced uniform conclusions, partly because of disagreements about the quality of 
available schooling data. Barro and Lee’s (1993) study, for example, indicates some 
positive but weak correlation between the overall schooling data they assembled and 
growth rates. Following Ehrlich and Kim 2007, we here attempt to offer a different 
perspective on the link between education and growth by stressing the 
correspondence between investments in education, rather than the level of educational 
attainments, and long-term growth rates of per-capita income. By our theoretical 
analysis, the steady state rates of investment in human capital, which are endogenous 
outcomes of underlying demographic, institutional and public policy variables, are the 
critical determinant of corresponding long-term growth rates of both per-worker 
human capital stocks and per-capita real output in a growth-equilibrium regime. 
While reported data on educational outlays are incomplete, investment levels can be 
imputed from time-series evidence on relatively long-term rates of growth of 
schooling attainments in different countries. We thus expect a systematic link 
between equilibrium values of average growth rates of schooling attainments per 
worker (H) and per-capita GDP (GDPPC) over relatively lengthy periods of time in 
countries experiencing persistent growth. To test this hypothesis, we first estimate 
expected growth rates of per-capita GDP, [1 + g(GDPPC)*], and schooling 
attainments, [1 + g(H)*], which are predicted from underlying country-specific 
factors through a regression model described below, and then compute their 
association using the following log-linear regression specification: 
 
(3) Log[1 + g(GDPPC)]* = α + βlog[1+ g(H)]* 
 
Specifically, we use Barro and Lee (2003) data on average schooling years attained 
by the population aged 15–65, and Summers and Heston estimates of real GDPPC as 
proxies for our endogenous variables, along with data on explanatory variables listed 
below, to construct a panel of fifty-seven developing and developed countries over an 
intermediate-length period of thirty-one years (1960–1991). We first run fixed-effects 
regressions relating each of our two endogenous variables to a set of underlying 
country-specific factors. These include demographic variables (population longevity 
measures), public policy variables (the share of government spending in GDP and a 
measure of the social security tax rate), as well as chronological time and the 
interaction terms of these explanatory variables with time. (For an explanation of the 19 
 
role of these explanatory variables see Ehrlich and Kim 2007) The fixed-effects 
specification also accounts for the role of idiosyncratic institutional factors that are 
unchanging over the sample period. This method allows us to generate multiple 
predicted values of g(GDPPC)* and g(H)*, in each country over our sample period. 
We can then estimate equation (3) using an OLS regression model. Variant 1 of the 
model imposes a common intercept term (α) representing the same technology linking 
human capital formation to output growth in all countries, whereas variant 2 allows 
for variation in the latter, using a fixed-effects regression specification.
7 
 
The idea behind this experiment follows the basic thesis underlying our endogenous 
growth model. If human capital is the engine of growth, the equilibrium rates of 
growth of the two endogenous variables of the model—human capital attainments 
g(H) and real income g(GDPPC)—should be outcomes of the economy’s institutional 
and demographic factors, including the degree of government intervention in private 
economic activity. If these two variables are predicted separately from these 
underlying country-specific “parameters,” they should be closely related within 
countries. The results are presented in figure 3 (appendix B) and table 10 (appendix 
A). Figure 3 shows the noisy scatter of estimated expected growth rates of per-capita 
GDP and average schooling attainments within countries. The line going through this 
scatter represents the estimated regression line of variant 1 of equation (3). Table 10 
shows also the estimated results of variant (2) of equation (3), which cannot be 
depicted graphically. The results in table 10 indicate the existence of a statistically 
significant correlation between the predicted growth rates of per-capita schooling 
attainments and real income within countries in our panel. These results are 
experimental and preliminary. More complete measures of human capital formation 
and productivity growth over longer periods, and more elaborate sensitivity analyses, 
would be required to confirm the findings. 
                                                 
7  The analysis involves the following steps. In step 1 we run fixed-effects regressions of 
log(GDPPC) or log(H) as a dependent variable on a set of regressors as follows: t, 
t*log(Pi1), t*log(Pi2), t*log(G), t*log(PEN), log(Pi1), log(Pi2), log(G), log(PEN), where 
t is chronological time in years, PEN is a measure of the social security tax rate, Pi1 and 
Pi2 are probabilities of survival of children to adulthood and of adults to old age, 
respectively, and G is the share of government spending in GDP. (For detail see Ehrlich 
and Kim 2007.) In step 2 we compute multiple predicted country-specific growth rates of 
GDP and H over the entire sample period, g(GDPPC)* and g(H)*, based on the estimated 
regression coefficients involving t and the interaction terms of the basic explanatory 
variables with t from step 1. This produces a large scatter of observations on 
1+g(GDPPC)* and 1+g(H)* allowing a meaningful estimation of equation (3). In step 3 
we then estimate variants 1 and 2 of equation (3) via OLS and fixed-effects regressions. 
Since the countries in our panel are in varying development stages, in additional 
regressions which we skip here for simplicity, we also allow the intercept terms in 
variants 1 and 2 to drift downward over time, which our model predicts to occur over the 
development process. These regressions produce very similar results to those reported in 




Epilogue: Looking Back and Looking Ahead 
 
Although the evidence assembled in this paper concerning the long-term growth 
dynamics of per-capita GDP and schooling attainments is largely “circumstantial,” it 
appear to be remarkably consistent with the view that human capital formation, even 
though imperfectly measured by schooling, has been the “secret weapon” through 
which the U.S. has been able to achieve its robust long-term rate of persistent, self-
sustaining growth in productivity and per-capital income. Moreover, it supports the 
hypothesis that the documented educational gap between the U.S. and Europe in 
terms of average high school, and especially higher education attainments, is a major 
factor explaining why the U.S. has overtaken Europe as an economic superpower in 
the twentieth century. Can the U.S. maintain its lead in the twenty-first century? 
 
Table 11 (see appendix A) summarizes the evidence on schooling attainments shown 
in tables 2 and 3 for the 5 major European countries (E-5: Germany, U.K., France, 
Italy, Spain) expressed as percentages of the U.S.’s attainments over the period 
1998–2003, which may serve as a rough indicator of the trends over the last few 
decades as well. Even over this short period we see evidence of closing educational 
gaps, primarily for upper high-school attainments, where the simple average level of 
schooling attainment for the age group 25–64 in the E-5 rose from 64.9% to 68.2% of 
that of the U.S. The gaps are closing even faster at the tertiary type-A level, where the 
corresponding simple average level of schooling attainments rose from 46.7% to 
51.7%. Of all E-5 countries, the U.K. has converged most closely to the U.S.’s 
schooling attainments at the tertiary level, rising from 55.6% in 1998 to 65.5% in 
2003.  
 
However, as argued earlier, schooling attainments are subject to institutional upper 
limits (say, Ph.D. education), thus becoming a less effective indicator of human 
capital formation at more advanced development levels, where spending on 
educational quality and knowledge generated within firms may be more important 
supplementary measures of effective human capital. The US may still maintain a 
significant lead over much of Europe in these measures. Indeed, corresponding trends 
in long-term GDP and per-capita GDP (GDPPC) growth rates present a more mixed 
picture. Figure 4 shows how percentage differences in long-term real GDPPC growth 
rates between the U.S., U.K., and the E-5 (based on the Maddison 2003 data) have 
evolved over the last 150 years, as we gradually shift the starting reference period 
from 1850–2003 (the longest time period) to 1991–2003 (the shortest and recent time 
period). The long-term percentage differences indicate a consistent U.S. advantage, 
although they also exhibit quite a bit of noise and sensitivity to influential 
intermediate-term sub-periods. For example, over the Great Depression, the U.S. 
absolute GDPPC gap over the E-5 was declining significantly along with the U.S.’s 
long-term growth rate advantage before rising again during recovery. Over World 
War II and its aftermath, in contrast, the U.S. absolute gap over the E-5 was first 
rising because of the collapse of the E-5 economies, but was then falling because of 
the exceptionally high GDPPC growth rates in the E-5 over the following 2–3 21 
 
decades of European recovery. More recently, however, the U.S. GDPPC growth rate 
advantage over the E-5 has trended back toward its 1850–2003 level.  
 
One exception seems to be the U.K., where the U.S.’s long-term GDPPC growth-rate 
gap has been falling more steadily since the early 1930s, and again from the early 
1960s when the U.K. has also made significant progress in relative educational 
attainments. In Germany, in contrast, the U.S.’s GDPPC growth-rate advantage has 
intensified since 1967, while its educational advantage over Germany has been 
increasing in more recent years. Thus even this, more recent evidence points to a 
positive correlation between relative growth rates of tertiary schooling attainments 
and per-capita GDP, at least in these two countries.
8 
  
Clearly, there are other forces in play which explain the evolution of comparative 
growth rates of the U.S. and the E-5 over the twentieth century, such as changes in 
labor market, welfare, free-trade, and immigration policies, but the U.S. advantage in 
human capital formation, as judged by schooling attainments especially at the tertiary 
level, seems to provide a powerful explanation for its long-term growth rate 
advantage over Europe.  
 
Is the U.S. losing this advantage? The closing schooling gaps might indicate that 
Europe could catch up with, and even surpass this indicator of U.S.’s human capital 
formation and ensuing per-capita income growth. However, as figure 5 shows, the 
absolute historic gap between the U.S. and the E-5 in per-capita GDP levels is still far 
from closing, and it will continue to grow in absolute terms even if the respective 
growth rates converge. More important, future developments depend on the 
comparative trends in the underlying causal factors which produced the U.S. long-
term advantage in the first place.  
 
Looking back, it is ultimately the relative efficiency of the free-market and open-
economy system in the U.S. and the relatively higher reward it provided to skill and 
creative knowledge, which induced a higher rate of growth and efficient utilization of 
various components of human capital, whether domestically produced or imported. 
The democratic political system in the U.S. has also augmented the process of human 
capital formation through prudent government subsidization of education generally, 
and higher education in particular, much ahead of similar efforts by Europe. These 
accommodating factors have been a major determinant of the ability of the U.S. to 
attract, and put to effective use, human capital from other countries as well.  
 
Looking ahead, therefore, one may conclude that continued support of an efficient 
economic environment that assures a competitive reward to investment in human 
                                                 
8 Spain constitutes another example: while the U.S.’s long-term growth rate of GDPPC 
1850–2003 slightly exceeds that of Spain, from 1877 Spain is reported to have had a 
higher growth rate, which expanded during World War II. Spain’s advantage is still 
holding in recent years as well, but it also shows the highest percentage increase in 
higher-education attainments among the E-5, according to table 12.  22 
 
capital and encourages its persistent formation and utilization could sustain the U.S. 
lead for years to come. The U.S. still enjoys a significant advantage in terms of the 
quality of its higher education system and innovative activities relative to Europe and 
other countries. At the same time, there are strong indications of the failure of the 
public elementary system in the U.S. to produce competitive educational outcomes 
relative to other countries. Recognition of current shortcomings in the public 
education system in the U.S., along with the challenge to compete with educational 
systems in other countries, may improve human capital formation in the U.S. at all 
levels. Whether or not the U.S. lead is maintained is ultimately a secondary issue. 
World welfare would be best served if all countries adopt competitive economic and 
educational policies yielding continuous human capital formation, per-capita income 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table A  Comparison of real GDP per capita for the top 25 countries   
(U.S. dollars converted using purchasing power parity) 
 
Country  Per Capita GDP  Estimate Year  Country Per Capita GDP  Estimate Year
Luxembourg  58900  2004  Austria 31300  2004
Jersey  40000  2003  Belgium 30600  2004
United States  40100  2004  United Kingdom 29600  2004
Norway  40000  2004  Netherlands 29500  2004
Bermuda  36000  2003  Japan 29400  2004
San Marino  34600  2001  Finland 29000  2004
Hong Kong  34200  2004  Aruba 28000  2002
Switzerland  33800  2004  Germany 28700  2004
Cayman Islands  32300  2004  France 28700  2004
Denmark  32200  2004  Sweden 28400  2004
Ireland  31900  2004  Monaco 27000  2000
Iceland  31900  2004  Singapore 27800  2004
Canada  31500  2004         
 
Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, The Word Factbook 2005, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook, file name: 
  factbook2005\factbook\fields\2004.html 
 




Table 1  Average years of formal educational experience of the population aged 15–64 in 
1913 and 1989 
 
1913
Country  Total (Rank)  Primary (Rank) Secondary (Rank) Higher (Rank)
France  6.18 (4)  4.31 (5) 1.77 (4) 0.10 (3) 
Germany  6.94 (2)  3.50 (6) 3.35 (1) 0.09 (4) 
Japan  5.10 (6)  4.50 (4) 0.56 (6) 0.04 (6) 
Netherlands  6.05 (5)  5.30 (1) 0.64 (5) 0.11 (2) 
United Kingdom  7.28 (1)  5.30 (1) 1.90 (2) 0.08 (5) 
United States  6.93 (3)  4.90 (3) 1.83 (3) 0.20 (1) 
        
 1989
Country  Total (Rank)  Primary (Rank) Secondary (Rank) Higher (Rank)
France  11.61 (3)  5.00 (5) 5.29 (2) 1.32 (2) 
Germany  9.58 (6)  4.00 (6) 5.20 (3) 0.38 (6) 
Japan  11.66 (2)  6.00 (1) 4.95 (4) 0.71 (3) 
Netherlands  10.51 (5)  6.00 (1) 3.82 (6) 0.69 (4) 
United Kingdom  11.28 (4)  6.00 (1) 4.75 (5) 0.53 (5) 
United States  13.39 (1)  6.00 (1) 5.72 (1) 1.67 (1) 
        
 




Table 2  Percentage of the population that has attained at least tertiary education  
Type-A by age group (1998 and 2003) 
 
   1998 2003 
Country  25–64  25–34  35–44 45–54 55–64 25-64 25–34 35–44  45–54  55–64
Australia   17  19  18 16 10 20 25 21  20  14
Austria  6  7  8 5 4 7 8 8  7  5
Belgium  12  16  13 10 6 13 18 14  11  8
Canada   19  23  18 18 13 22 28 22  20  18
Czech Republic   10  10  12 10 8 12 12 14  11  10
Finland  13  14  15 13 8 16 23 17  14  12
France   11  15  10 10 6 14 22 13  11  10
Germany  14  14  16 15 10 14 14 15  15  12
Greece  11  15  14 10 6 13 17 15  12  7
Hungary   13  14  14 14 10 15 17 16  15  14
Iceland  16  19  18 15 9 20 23 22  19  12
Ireland  11  16  11 7 5 16 23 16  13  9
Italy   9  9  11 9 5 10 12 11  10  7
Japan   18  23  23 15 9 21 26 25  20  12
Korea  17  23  19 11 8 22 30 26  14  9
Luxembourg   N/A  N/A  N/A N/A N/A 6 7 7  6  4
Mexico  12  15  14 10 5 14 16 15  12  7
Netherlands  24  27  26 23 17 22 25 23  21  17
New Zealand   13  16  13 12 7 16 21 17  15  10
Norway  24  27  25 22 17 29 37 30  25  20
Poland  11  12  10 11 10 14 20 13  11  11
Portugal   7  8  7 5 4 8 13 9  6  3
Slovak Republic  N/A  N/A  N/A N/A N/A 11 13 11  12  8
Spain  14  21  16 11 6 18 26 19  14  9
Sweden   13  10  14 15 11 18 24 17  17  16
Switzerland   14  16  15 13 11 18 20 19  16  15
Turkey   6  7  7 6 3 10 11 8  9  7
United Kingdom  15  17  17 15 11 19 24 19  18  14
United States   27  27  26 29 22 29 30 29  30  27
Country Mean  14  16  15 13 9 16 20 17  15  12
Note: Denmark is omitted in this table because the reported annual data for tertiary type-
A attainments in Denmark are incompatible between 1998 and 2003. But the overall 
country mean includes Denmark. 
 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2000, 36, table A2.2b 
OECD, Education at a Glance 2005, Indicator A1: Educational attainment of the adult 
population, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/35/35282639.xls  (table A.1.3a). 28 
 
       Table 3  Distribution of the population that has attained at least upper secondary 
education, by age group (1998 and 2003) 
    
   1998 2003 
Country  25–64  25–34  35–44  45–54  55–64  25–64  25–34  35–44  45–54  55–64 
Australia   56  64  58 52 44 62 75 64  58  47
Austria  73  84  78 68 56 79 85 83  75  69
Belgium  57  73  61 51 34 62 78 68  55  43
Canada   80  87  83 77 65 84 90 86  83  71
Czech Republic   85  92  88 84 74 86 92 90  84  77
Denmark   78  85  80 78 67 81 86 82  80  74
Finland  68  84  78 62 41 76 89 85  73  55
France  61  75  63 56 41 65 80 69  59  48
Germany  84  88  87 84 76 83 85 86  84  78
Greece  44  66  52 36 22 51 72 60  44  28
Hungary   63  77  73 65 31 74 83 81  75  53
Iceland  55  61  58 55 40 59 64 62  58  48
Ireland  51  67  56 41 31 62 78 67  52  38
Italy  41  55  50 35 19 44 60 50  39  24
Japan   80  93  91 77 57 84 94 94  82  65
Korea  65  92  70 45 27 73 97 83  55  32
Luxembourg   N/A  N/A  N/A N/A N/A 59 68 61  54  50
Mexico  21  26  23 16 9 21 25 24  18  12
Netherlands  64  74  68 59 50 66 76 71  62  53
New Zealand   73  79  77 69 58 78 84 81  76  64
Norway  83  93  88 78 65 87 95 92  85  76
Poland  54  62  59 53 37 48 57 49  46  40
Portugal   20  29  20 14 12 23 37 22  16  10
Slovak Republic  N/A  N/A  N/A N/A N/A 87 94 91  84  70
Spain  33  53  38 23 12 43 60 48  33  19
Sweden   76  87  80 73 60 82 91 88  80  69
Switzerland   81  88  83 80 71 70 76 72  68  61
Turkey   18  24  19 13 7 26 33 25  21  16
United Kingdom  60  63  62 58 53 65 71 65  64  57
United States   86  88  88 87 80 88 87 88  89  85
Country Mean  61  72  65 57 44 66 75 70  62  51
 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2000, 35, table A2.2. 
OECD, Education at a Glance 2005, Indicator A1: Educational attainment of the 
adult population, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/35/35282639.xls (table 
A.1.2a). 29 
 
Table 4  Expected years of tertiary education for all 17-year-olds (1998) 
 
Country  Full and Part Time Rank Full Time Only  Rank 
Australia  2.3 5 1.4 16  
Austria  1.8 14 1.8 8  
Belgium  1.3 21 1.2 20  
Canada  1.9 10 1.4 16  
Czech Republic  0.9 24 0.8 24  
Denmark  1.3 21 1.3 19  
Finland  2.9 1 2.9 1  
France  1.9 11 1.9 5  
Germany  1.7 15 1.7 11  
Greece  1.7 15 1.7 11  
Hungary  1.6 19 0.9 23  
Iceland  1.6 19 1.6 14  
Ireland  N/A ~ N/A ~ 
Italy  2.2 7 2.2 4  
Japan  N/A ~ N/A ~ 
Korea  1.9 11 1.9 5  
Luxembourg N/A ~ N/A ~ 
Mexico  0.8 25 0.8 24  
Netherlands 2.2 7 1.9 5  
New Zealand 2.1 9 1.5 15  
Norway  2.7 2 2.4 2  
Poland  1.9 11 1.0 22  
Portugal  1.7 15 1.7 11  
Spain  2.5 4 2.3 3  
Sweden  2.3 5 1.8 8  
Switzerland  1.1 23 1.1 21  
Turkey  0.8 26 0.8 24  
United Kingdom  1.7 15 1.4 16  
United States 2.7 2 1.8 8  
OECD Average                 1.8              1.6
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Table 5  Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP for all levels of 
education by source of funds (1990, 1995, and 2002) 
 
   2002     1995    1990    
Country  Public  Private Total Public Private Total Public  Private  Total
Australia  4.4  1.5  6.0 4.5 1.2 5.7 4.2  0.8  5.0
Austria  5.4  0.3  5.7 5.9 0.3 6.1 N/A  N/A  N/A
Belgium  6.1  0.3  6.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Canada  N/A  N/A  N/A 6.2 0.8 7.0 N/A  N/A  N/A
Czech Republic  4.2  0.2  4.4 4.7 0.7 5.4 N/A  N/A  N/A
Denmark  6.8  0.3  7.1 6.1 0.2 6.3 N/A  N/A  N/A
Finland  5.9  0.1  6.0 6.2 x 6.3 N/A  N/A  N/A
France  5.7  0.4  6.1 5.9 0.4 6.3 5.1  0.5  5.7
Germany  4.4  0.9  5.3 4.5 0.9 5.4 N/A  N/A  N/A
Greece  3.9  0.2  4.1 3.1 n 3.2 N/A  N/A  N/A
Hungary  5.0  0.6  5.6 4.9 0.6 5.5 N/A  N/A  N/A
Iceland  6.8  0.6  7.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Ireland  4.1  0.3  4.4 4.7 0.5 5.3 N/A  N/A  N/A
Italy  4.6  0.3  4.9 4.7 N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Japan  3.5  1.2  4.7 3.5 1.1 4.7 N/A  N/A  N/A
Korea  4.2  2.9  7.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Luxembourg  N/A  N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Mexico  5.1  1.1  6.3 4.6 1.0 5.6 N/A  N/A  N/A
Netherlands  4.6  0.5  5.1 4.5 0.4 4.9 N/A  N/A  N/A
New Zealand  5.6  1.2  6.8 4.8 N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Norway  6.7  0.3  6.9 6.8 0.4 7.1 8.1  N/A  N/A
Poland  5.5  0.7  6.1 5.7 N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Portugal  5.7  0.1  5.8 5.3 n 5.3 N/A  N/A  N/A
Slovak Republic  4.0  0.2  4.2 4.6 0.1 4.7 4.8  0.3  5.1
Spain  4.3  0.5  4.9 4.5 0.9 5.4 4.4  0.7  5.1
Sweden  6.7  0.2  6.9 6.1 0.1 6.2 5.1  N/A  5.1
Switzerland  5.7  0.5  6.2 5.4 N/A N/A N/A  N/A  N/A
Turkey  3.4  0.4  3.8 2.3 N/A 2.3 2.8  N/A  2.8
United Kingdom  5.0  0.9  5.9 4.8 0.7 5.5 4.2  0.1  4.3
United States  5.3  1.9  7.2 5.0 2.2 7.2 4.9  2.2  7.1
Country mean  5.1  0.7  5.8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~
OECD total  4.9  1.2  6.1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~
 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2005, Indicator B2: Expenditure on educational 
institutions relative to Gross Domestic Product, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/11/35286380.xls  (table B2.1a). 
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Table 6  Annual expenditures on educational institutions per student (US dollars 
converted using PPP) by levels of education based on full-time equivalents (2002) 
 
Country  Primary All secondary Tertiary-type A All tertiary 
Australia   5169 7375 13410 12416 
Austria   7015 8887 12701 12448 
Belgium   5665 8272 N/A 12019 
Canada   N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Czech Republic   2077 3628 6671 6236 
Denmark   7727 8003 N/A 15183 
Finland   5087 7121 11833 11768 
France   5033 8472 9132 9276 
Germany   4537 7025 11860 10999 
Greece   3803 4058 5646 4731 
Hungary  3016 3184 8187 8205 
Iceland   7171 7229 8232 8251 
Ireland   4180 5725 N/A 9809 
Italy  7231 7568 8649 8636 
Japan   6117 6952 11984 11716 
Korea   3553 5882 7630 6047 
Luxembourg   10611 15195 N/A N/A 
Mexico   1467 1768 N/A 6074 
Netherlands   5558 6823 13163 13101 
New Zealand   4536 5698 N/A N/A 
Norway   7508 10154 N/A 13739 
Poland   2585 N/A N/A 4834 
Portugal  4940 6921 N/A 6960 
Slovak Republic  1471 2193 4756 4756 
Spain   4592 6010 8074 8020 
Sweden   7143 7400 N/A 15715 
Switzerland  7776 11900 25524 23714 
Turkey  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
United Kingdom  5150 6505 N/A 11822 
United States   8049 9098 N/A 20545 
Country Mean  5313 7002 ~ 10655 
OECD Mean  5273 6992 ~ 13343 
  
Source: OECD, Education at Glance 2005, Indicator B1: Educational expenditure per 
student, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/12/35286348.xls  (table B1.1). 32 
 
Table 7  Expenditure per student (public and private) relative to GDP per capita by level 
of education based on full-time equivalents (2002) 
 
Country All secondary education All tertiary education 




Czech Republic  22 38
Denmark  27 51
Finland 26 42
France 31 34





Italy  29 33
Japan  26 43
Korea  32 33
Luxembourg  29 N/A
Mexico 19 65
Netherlands  23 44




Slovak Republic  17 38
Spain  26 35
Sweden 26 56
Switzerland  37 73
Turkey N/A N/A
United Kingdom  23 41
United States  25 57
Country Mean  26 43
 
Source: OECD, Education at Glance 2005, Indicator B1: Educational expenditure per 
student, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/12/35286348.xls  (table B1.2). 33 
 
Table 8  Average combined mathematics literacy scores of 15-year-old students by 
percentiles (2003) 
 
 Country  5th  10th 25th 75th 90th 95th 
90th–0th
difference
  Australia  364  399 460 592 645 676  246
  Austria  353  384 439 571 626 658  242
  Belgium  334  381 456 611 664 693  284
  Canada  386  419 474 593 644 673  225
  Czech Republic  358  392 449 584 641 672  249
  Denmark  361  396 453 578 632 662  236
  Finland  406  438 488 603 652 680  214
  France  352  389 449 575 628 656  239
  Germany  324  363 432 578 632 662  269
  Greece  288  324 382 508 566 598  242
  Hungary  335  370 426 556 611 644  241
  Iceland  362  396 454 578 629 658  233
  Ireland  360  393 445 562 614 641  221
  Italy  307  342 400 530 589 623  247
  Japan  361  402 467 605 660 690  258
  Korea   388  423 479 606 659 690  236
  Luxembourg  338  373 430 557 611 641  239
  Mexico  247  276 327 444 497 527  221
  Netherlands  385  415 471 608 657 684  241
  New Zealand  359  394 455 593 650 682  256
  Norway  343  376 433 560 614 645  238
  Poland  343  376 428 553 607 640  231
  Portugal  321  352 406 526 580 610  228
  Slovak Republic  342  379 436 565 619 648  241
  Spain  335  369 426 546 597 626  229
  Sweden  353  387 446 576 631 662  243
  Switzerland  359  396 461 595 652 684  256
  Turkey  270  300 351 485 560 614  260
  United States  323  357 418 550 607 638  251
  OECD Average  332  369 432 570 628 660  259
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute for Education Sciences, National Center 
for Education Statistics, “International Comparisons of Mathematics Literacy,” 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section2/table.asp?tableID=464. 34 
 
Table 9  Estimated Coefficients from Mincer Log-Earnings Regressions for Males 
 
     Whites  Blacks 
        Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
1940 Intercept    4.4771  0.0096  4.6711  0.0298 
 Education   0.1250  0.0007  0.0871  0.0022 
 Experience   0.0904  0.0005  0.0646  0.0018 
 Experience-Squared    -0.0013  0.0000  -0.0009  0.0000 
              
1950 Intercept    5.3120  0.0132  5.0716  0.0409 
 Education   0.1058  0.0009  0.0998  0.0030 
 Experience   0.1074  0.0006  0.0933  0.0023 
 Experience-Squared    -0.0017  0.0000  -0.0014  0.0000 
              
1960 Intercept    5.6478  0.0066  5.4107  0.0220 
 Education   0.1152  0.0005  0.1034  0.0016 
 Experience   0.1156  0.0003  0.1035  0.0011 
 Experience-Squared    -0.0018  0.0000  -0.0016  0.0000 
              
1970 Intercept    5.9113  0.0045  5.8938  0.0155 
 Education   0.1179  0.0003  0.1100  0.0012 
 Experience   0.1323  0.0002  0.1074  0.0007 
 Experience-Squared    -0.0022  0.0000  -0.0016  0.0000 
              
1980 Intercept    6.8913  0.0030  6.4448  0.0120 
 Education   0.1023  0.0002  0.1176  0.0009 
 Experience   0.1255  0.0001  0.1075  0.0005 
 Experience-Squared    -0.0022  00.000  -0.0016  0.0000 
              
1990 Intercept    6.8912  0.0034  6.3474  0.0144 
 Education   0.1292  0.0002  0.1524  0.0011 
 Experience   0.1301  0.0001  0.1109  0.0006 
 Experience-Squared    -0.0023  0.0000  -0.0017  0.0000 
               
 
    Source: Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 2003. 
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Table 10  Correlating Predicted Growth Rates in Per Capita GDP and Average School 
Years of the Adult Population (based on Ehrlich and Kim 2007) 
 
 Intercept (α) Slope(β) t-value (β) Adjusted R
2 
Variant 1 *  0.00567 1.67458 21.23 0.3036 
Variant 2 **  **  1.25854 11.40 0.3682 
                  
      Number of observations = 1,032. 
                  
      *    OLS regression estimates of equation (3) 
      **  OLS fixed-effects regression estimates of equation (3) allowing for        
             country-specific intercepts, not reported in this table. 
 
      Econometric procedure: see text and footnote 6.  36 
 
Table 11  Relative percentage differences in educational attainments (U.S. = 100) by level and age group (1998 and 2003) 
 
Attaining at least tertiary education Type-A: 
 
Attaining at least upper secondary education: 
 1998  2003 
Country  25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
United  States  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
France  70.9 85.2 71.6 64.4 51.3 73.9 92.0 78.4 66.3 56.5 
Germany  97.7  100.0  98.9 96.6 95.0 94.3 97.7 97.7 94.4 91.8 
Italy  47.7 62.5 56.8 40.2 23.8 50.0 69.0 56.8 43.8 28.2 
Spain  38.4 60.2 43.2 26.4 15.0 48.9 69.0 54.5 37.1 22.4 
United  Kingdom 69.8 71.6 70.5 66.7 66.3 73.9 81.6 73.9 71.9 67.1 
E4*  63.7 77.0 67.6 56.9 46.3 66.8 81.9 71.9 60.4 49.7 
E5** 64.9 75.9 68.2 58.9 50.3 68.2 81.8 72.3 62.7 53.2
E12****  80.0 89.9 83.1 74.9 65.9 81.4 93.1 86.3 77.2 69.3 
*E4: Simple average of the normalized data for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
**E5: Simple average of the normalized data for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom 
*** E11: Simple average of the normalized data for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,  
       and the United Kingdom 
**** E12: Simple average of the normalized data for E11 countries and Denmark 
 1998  2003 
Country 25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
US  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
France  40.7 55.6 38.5 34.5 27.3 48.3 73.3 44.8 36.7 37.0 
Germany  51.9 51.9 61.5 51.7 45.5 48.3 46.7 51.7 50.0 44.4 
Italy  33.3 33.3 42.3 31.0 22.7 34.5 40.0 37.9 33.3 25.9 
Spain  51.9 77.8 61.5 37.9 27.3 62.1 86.7 65.5 46.7 33.3 
United  Kingdom 55.6 63.0 65.4 51.7 50.0 65.5 80.0 65.5 60.0 51.9 
E4*  44.4 54.6 51.0 38.8 30.7 48.3 61.7 50.0 41.7 35.2 
E5**  46.7 56.3 53.8 41.4 34.5 51.7 65.3 53.1 45.3 38.5 



















































































Appendix B: Figures 
 
 




Note: GDP data are converted to 1990 U.S. dollars using the Geary-Khamis Purchasing-Power-
Parity (PPP) method. Data for 1851–1859 and 1861–1869 are imputed.  
 
Source: Data from Maddison 2003. 























































































Note: Per-capita GDP data are converted to 1990 U.S. dollars using the Geary-Khamis 
Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) method. Data for 1851–1859 and 1861–1869 are imputed.  
 













Figure 3  Correlating predicted growth rates in per-capita GDP and average school years 




















































Figure 4  Deviations in long-term per-capita GDP growth rates per annum over the 
period 1850–2003 between the U.S. and E-5, and U.S. and U.K. 
 
 
Notes: Chart shows Percentage differences measured at progressively later starting dates from 
1850-2003 up to 1991-2003. GDP data are in real (PPP) 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars.  
* E5 includes: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom 
 



























 Figure 5  Annual per-capita GDP differences between the U.S. and 






















Source: Data from Maddison 2003. 
 
 